Cadbury Lectures 2015


Thoroughly enjoyed the opportunity to listen to William Lane Craig at this years Cadbury Lectures at the University of Birmingham!

Dr. Craig lectured on the challenge that “heavyweight” Platonism – the idea that abstract objects, like numbers, sets, and possible worlds, exist and are as real as concrete objects like cars or persons – poses to Classical Theism.  He surveyed the range of possible responses available to the Theist and put forth several arguments against the traditional notion that abstract objects exist in the mind of God.

Ultimately, Dr. Craig advocates an anti-realist approach to abstracta; which is quite a controversial position for a Christian philosopher to adopt.  While I can appreciate why he is making this move, I’m not convinced it’s the correct one to make.

Nevertheless, it was a great experience and a wonderful opportunity to meet a great scholar.  Here’s a picture featuring WLC with my dear friend Tyler McNabb (a PhD candidate at the University of Glasgow) and yours truly:



On the Nature of God with St. John of Damascus

“As regards what God is, it is impossible to say what He is in His essence, so it is better to discuss Him by abstraction from all things whatsoever.  For He does not belong to the number of beings, not because He does not exist, but because He transcends all beings and being itself.  And, if knowledge respects beings, then that which transcends knowledge will certainly transcend essence, and, conversely, what transcends essence will transcend knowledge.”

Further Reflections on Total Depravity

(this is a repost of a series I wrote for another website last year)

In my previous post, Why I Don’t Believe in Total Depravity, I addressed some of the primary reasons I refuse to accept the Reformed Doctrine of Total Depravity.  This article generated a lot of interesting discussion, both on The Christian Watershed and on Facebook.  Sadly, due to time constraints, I was unable to interact, deeply, with many of the insightful comments that were made.  Hopefully, this article will make up for my lack of response.

Interestingly, virtually everyone who commented on my previous article focused, almost exclusively, on my first objection, which argued that if man is by nature a sinner, then God wouldn’t love him.  Hardly anyone addressed my second two objections: that Total Depravity is at odds with the Doctrine of the Incarnation, and that, for a totally depraved creature, sin would be a virtue.  Accordingly, I would like to focus on the first objection (for the sake of clarification) and from there build several more arguments against Total Depravity.

Most of the questions or objections to my first argument seemed to flow from a basic misunderstanding of the term “nature.”  In light of this, let me take a moment to define this technical philosophical term.

When we speak of a things nature we are commenting about that which makes it what it is.  In other words, the nature of a thing is the essential quality which makes it what it is.      So, for example, if we said that man (in the universal sense: all “men”, both male and female) is made in the image of God we are making a statement about man’s  nature.  We are saying that being made in the image of God is an essential/universal quality of what it is to be a man.  If being made in the image of God is a part of the nature of man then any creature which is not made in the image of God is not a man.  Hence, we see that by changing the nature of thing we are changing what that thing is.

With this fresh in our minds, allow me to restate one of the basic conclusions of Total Depravity; namely, that due to the fall there was an ontological shift (i.e. a change in man’s nature) in man.  According to this view, sin is now a part of man’s nature; in other words, sin is an essential/universal quality of what it means to be a man (hence, the term totally depraved).  If this is true, then any creature who is without sin is not a man because sin is a necessary part of what it means to be man.

With these definitions in place, let’s revisit my first contention:

(1) If sin is an essential/universal quality of what it means to be man then man is absolutely unlovable.

Put simply, a totally depraved creature would be unlovable because its very nature would be counter to God, who is the only being truly and perfectly lovable in and of Himself.

Several commentators actually accepted this point and argued that God loves what is unlovable; maintaining that this was simply a mystery.  However, to claim that God loves what is by nature unlovable is not “mysterious” . . . it is simply illogical.  Does it really make sense to claim that God loves a creature that we have established to be fundamentally unlovable?  Just think about this for a moment.  Saying that a creature is unlovable is claiming that there is nothing intrinsically lovable about said creature; can we then claim, with any consistency, that God loves something unlovable?

Furthermore, too say that a creature is unlovable is to say that that creature’s very nature is counter to THE GOOD (i.e. God).  But, how could God love what is necessarily counter to Himself?  Sin is not a substance it is a degradation of something good.  If, then, we accept that God is the Good, and that God has nothing to do with darkness, and that only good things come from God, and that God will never do anything which goes against Himself (i.e. the Good), then we cannot believe, coherently, that God could love a creature which is totally depraved.

Now that I’ve clarified this argument (I hope) allow me to address several other problems with total depravity which stem from this one.  In so doing, I also hope to address several other objections brought up by commentators.

(2) If sin is an essential/universal quality of what it means to be man then the image of God in man has been totally erased. 

Some commentators insisted, as most Reformed thinkers do, that man still maintains the image of God in spite of the fact that he is totally depraved.  However, like those who argue that God can love something which is by nature unlovable, this assertion is illogical.  It is simply incoherent to maintain that a creature is by nature a sinner and, hence, not good, while also maintaining that he is made in the image and likeness of Goodness Himself.  This is tantamount to claiming that you are by nature good and by nature not good which, of course, violates the law of noncontradiction.

To claim that a creature is made in the image of God is to claim that he is made in the image of Goodness.  There is no getting around the fact that such a creature, itself, would be good.  So understood, it is a matter of  necessity that any creature made in the image of God must lose this aspect of his nature in order to become totally depraved.  In other words, in order to accept the premise that man is by nature a sinner and unlovable  we must also accept that he is no longer made in the image and likeness of God.

However, as I clarified earlier, to alter the nature of a thing is to change the thing itself.  Thus, a man who was no longer made in the image of God would be no man at all.  If the image of God has been erased in a creature then so has that creatures humanity.

So, in order to be logically consistent with their beliefs, those who embrace total depravity must also admit that man no longer bears the image and likeness of God.  If this is true, however, we are no longer men but some freakish, unlovable, being which does not deserve its existence and, in fact, is by nature counter to Existence Himself.

(3) If sin was an essential/universal quality of what it means to be man then man could not exist. 

This assertion ties in directly to the previous one.  It stands to reason that our existence, as creatures, stems directly from God who has revealed Himself to us as The Existent One (Exodus 3:14).  It is God alone whose existence is necessary and who exists in and of Himself; everything else, all of creation, is contingent; that is to say, its existence is dependent upon God.  To say that a creature is totally depraved is to say that it is, by nature, counter to the Good (i.e. God); which is also to say that it is by nature counter to Existence Himself.

For it is God who gives all things existence.  How, therefore, can we consistently maintain that a creature whose nature is totally corrupted, evil, and counter to God, maintain its existence without also accepting that God creates and sustains pure substantiated evil.  Christians, however, have never accepted the premise that God creates and sustains evil; for this would put God in league with evil and make him the source and direct cause of all evil.  Most Christians have also, in line with the early church Fathers and especially St. Augustine, rejected the notion that sin is a substance at all.

The problem is, if we believe that God is the source of all existence and accept total depravity then we are accepting that sin is substantiated, that sin is a substance–being a part of the fundamental nature of man–and that God creates and sustains the existence of pure evil.  Clearly, this is at odds with everything we know about God from the scriptures!  A good and loving God who is light and who has no darkness in Him at all could not give existence to pure substantiated evil.  Hence, if sin was an essential/universal quality of what it is to be man then man could not exist; for God would not bring such a being into existence.

Actually, it stands to reason that God could not bring into existence something which is counter to Himself–sense He is the source of all existence.  Therefore, something which is by nature counter to Him could not exist.

Metaphysics and the Hypostatic-Union of Christ: How Philosophy Can Be the Theologians Greatest Ally

It is commonly perceived that philosophy leads to a corruption of the basic message of the Bible.  This fear of corruption is why so many Christians are adverse to the idea of philosophical theology.  While it is true that bad philosophy, or at least, an improper use of philosophy, can lead to a corruption of the Gospel, it is false to conclude that philosophy itself is destructive or inherently evil.  Philosophy, when utilized appropriately, can be the theologians most valuable ally.  This is because philosophy teaches one how to think critically and enables one to make subtle, yet crucial, distinctions between important categories.  It can provide a metaphysical framework in which clear theological discussion can take place. By demonstrating the important roll that metaphysics–a sub-discipline of philosophy–played within the great Christological controversy of the fifth century, this article seeks to provide a positive example of how philosophy can be utilized by theologians.  To accomplish this goal, this essay will focus exclusively on the debate over the hypostatic-union of Christ which culminated in the Council of Chalcedon in 451.  It will begin by defining the metaphysical terms employed by the Church Fathers involved in this debate, then proceed to explain the opposing interpretations of Christ’s nature, put forth by the Alexandrian and Antiochene schools, and conclude by explaining how Leontius of Byzantium reconciled these two schools and developed what is now the orthodox view of the nature of Christ.  It is my hope that this survey of the Christological controversy will open your eyes to the usefulness and importance of philosophical theology.

Some Preliminary Remarks

The fifth century debate over the nature of Christ was extremely complex–utilizing a host of metaphysical terms developed by Greek philosophers.  Some Christians are turned off by this–believing such debates are a waste of time.  They argue that such captious debates have nothing to do with faith and simply distract people from the, “simple message of the Gospel.”  People who make such arguments fail to understand that any created thing can distract people from the, “simple message of the Gospel.”  This includes both philosophy and theology.  Philosophy is man’s pursuit to make sense of reality and theology is man’s pursuit to understand God–as such, they are both anthropocentric.  But, this does not make them inherently wrong.

Such reasoning also fails to recognize the practical importance of theological precision.  Controversies over the use of one word can drastically alter, “the simple message of the gospel;” especially ones which involve the very nature of Christ.  Who you understand Christ to be–how you define His nature–has a profound impact on how you interpret other, “weightier,” theological issues such as your theory of the atonement or soteriology.  How  you define Christ’s  nature also impacts the way in which you practically live out your faith.  In his monumental treatise, On The Holy Spirit, St. Basil the Great asserted that,

Those who are idle in the pursuit of righteousness count theological terminology as secondary, together with attempts to search out the hidden meaning in this phrase or that syllable, but those conscious of the goal of our calling realize that we are to become like God, as far as this is possible for human nature.  But we cannot become like God unless we have knowledge of Him (St. Basil, 16).

Rather than consider the following explication of metaphysical terms an impractical waste of time, consider it to be part of your “pursuit of righteousness”–an endeavoring to gain a deeper knowledge of God in order live righteously.  For, this is no stale academic debate–but the very center of the Gospel itself is at stake–Jesus Christ.

Defining Terms

Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of reality. The most fundamental element of metaphysics is what philosopher’s call ontology–that is, the study of existence or “being” (Mitchell, 5).  As St. John of Damascus explains, “Being is the common name for all things which are” (St. John, 13).  The controversy over the hypostatic-union of Christ in the fifth century was primarily concerned with ontology–that is, in explaining the nature of Christ’s existence or being. St. John further explains that being can be divided into both substance and accident.  Substance is, “a thing which exists in itself and has no need of another for its existence.  Accident, however, is that which cannot exist in itself, but has its existence in another.” (St. John, 14).  To illustrate, consider an apple.  An individual apple is a substance; a color, such as red, is an accidental property.  An apple, exists in and of itself, but the color red has its existence in a substance–like an apple or a flower.  A substance contains the essential properties that make an entity what it is.  What is most important to understand, for the purpose of this paper, is the concept of substance.  As will be made clear, the debate over the hypostatic-union of Christ had to do with explaining how two substances–God and Man–could exist in one person. There are three other metaphysical terms to define which are crucial to understanding the debate over the hypostatic-union:  hypostasis, anhypostasis, and enhypostasis.  According to St. John, hypostasis can be used as a general term for simple existence or, as in the case of the Church Fathers, can be used to refer to an individual substance–for example, Peter or Paul (St. John, 66-67).  What makes it different from the word substance is that hypostasis refers to the entire instantiated being–that is, to both a substance (the essential qualities of something) and its accidental properties (the non-essential qualities of something).  In other words, hypostasis refers to the essential qualities that make up Paul (the substance) and to the non-essential properties (the accidents, such as, skin color, etc.) that make up Paul–his entire instantiated being. According to St. John, anhypostasis, “sometimes means that which has no existence whatsoever, that is to say, the non-existent.  But it sometimes means that which does not have its being in itself but exists in another, that is to say, the accident” (St. John, 69).  So, anhypostasis can refer to that which does not exist or can simply be used as a synonym for accidental properties.  Enhypostasis, on the other hand, is, “that which is compound with another thing differing in substance to make up one particular whole and constitute one compound hypostasis” (St. John, 69).  A further explanation of this concept will be provided later–for the time being, this will have to suffice.  The important thing is, with these basic definitions, you are now in a better position to examine  the conflicting positions of the Alexandrian and Antiochene schools.

The Alexandrian School

The Alexandrian school emphasized the unity of Christ to a fault.  Although they recognized Christ was the Word who became flesh, composed of both divine and human elements, their interpretation of the incarnation blurred the lines of demarcation between the two natures.  The Alexandrian theologians believed that, “the Logos existed “without flesh” before its union with human nature,” but after that union, there remained, “only one nature, in that the Logos united human nature to itself” (McGrath, 336 Emphasis mine).  To use the terminology of metaphysics–somehow, two distinct substances–God and Man–had combined to form a new substance–Christ.  Thus, according to the Alexandrian’s, in Christ “the natures of God and humanity join[ed] so intimately that they form[ed] a compound or  hybrid”  (Olson, 210). Within this “hybrid” neither the divine nor the human natures are fully instantiated or hypostatized.  This is referred to as anhypostasia; because the divine and human elements do not exist in and of themselves, but in an entirely new substance (i.e. the incarnation).  In a sense, the Alexandrian understanding of the incarnation reduces the divine and human elements of Christ to mere accidental properties.  In their efforts to preserve the unity of Christ, they adopted a severely problematic understanding of Christ’s nature.  If Christ is not fully divine and fully human, then what is He?  What are the theological consequences to understanding Christ as being a mixture or hybrid of divinity and humanity?  If He is not fully God, is He worthy of our adoration and praise?  If He is not fully man, is He a worthy substitutional sacrifice or ransom for the sin of humanity?

The Antiochene School

In contrast to the Alexandrian school, the Antiochene school emphasized the two natures of Christ to a fault.  As Roger Olson explains, “The Antiochenes argued that Jesus Christ is two natures and two persons . . . who can also be conceived as one person, just as many communities or societies of more than one person are corporate persons in the eyes of the law.  When it comes to personhood, Antiochenes averred, two can become one while remaining two”  (Olson, 210 Emphasis mine).  In other words, Christ was composed of two distinct substances working together as one person.  In the words of Alister E. McGrath, the Antiochene’s understood that, “There is a “perfect conjunction” between the human and divine natures in Christ” (McGrath, 338). Unlike the Alexandrian interpretation, there is no mixing or mingling of the two natures–for the Antiochene’s, both the human and divine natures of Christ remained fully in tact.  As McGrath explains, the two natures are “watertight compartments within Christ.  They never interact, or mingle with one another.  They remain distinct, being held together by the good pleasure of God”  (McGrath, 339).  To their credit, they avoided the Alexandrian belief that Christ was the compound of two substances mingled together to form a new hybrid substance.  However, in their reaction against the Alexandrians, they mistakenly postulated that Christ was a conjunction of two distinct people. One of the Antiochene’s leading spokesmen for this view, Theodore of Mopsuestia, argued that the Logos, “assumed him [the man Jesus] and united him to himself . . . And because of this exact conjunction which this human being has with God the Son, the whole creation honors and worships him”  (McGrath, 338).  In their attempt to maintain two distinct natures within Christ the Antiochene’s succumbed to a sophisticated form of the heresy known as adoptionism.  While Theodore would object to this assertion, this is the logical conclusion of his position.  Ultimately, the Antiochene school pictures Jesus as a man who was intimately united with–adopted by–the Logos of God.  This view is problematic to say the least. If Christ is two people, then who are we worshiping when we worship Christ–just the “God” part?  How do we, as Christians, relate to this mysterious second person?  Has the human nature’s identity been entirely subsumed by the Logos?  Who died on the cross, the human person or the divine person?  These questions, and many more, arise while considering the Antiochene view.

Leontius of Byzantium

It was the Christology of Leontius of Byzantium which eventually won the day and was ratified by the Council of Chalcedon in 451.  As the reader probably suspects, Leontius devised a way in which one could maintain the two distinct natures of Christ, which was important to the Antiochenes–while adhering to the complete unity of Christ–which was important to the Alexandrians–without falling into heresy.  Leontius achieved this, “conceptual leap,” by developing, “the principle of the enhypostasia of the human nature of Christ in the divine Word”  (Olson, 245). If you recall, the term enhypostasia refers to, “that which is compound with another thing differing in substance to make up one particular whole and constitute one compound hypostasis” (St. John, 69).  The brilliance of enhypostasia is that it maintains that one substance can be hypostatized–actualized, instantiated, or personalized–within another substance without losing any of its properties.  “Leontius argued that while a nature–even a human nature–cannot exist without a hypostasis, it need not have its own hypostasis.  I can be “hypostatized” in another.  In other words, for Leontius, “the human nature of Christ was not without hypostasis, but became hypostatic [instantiated or personalized] in the Person of the Logos”  (Olson, 245).  St. John of Damascus elaborates further,

That nature is called enhypostaton which has been assumed by another hypostasis and in     this has its existence.  Thus, the body of the Lord, since it never subsisted of itself, not even for an instant, is not a hypostasis, but an enhypostaton.  And this is because it was     assumed by the hypostasis of God the Word and this subsisted, and did and does have this     for a hypostasis (St. John, 69).

In other words, in the incarnation the human nature of Christ was compounded with the divine nature of Christ–making up one particular whole–and, thus, constituting one compound hypostasis  (St. John, 69). It is important to note that Leontius’ conception of the humanity of Christ does not purport to explain the incarnation–for the deep mystery of this event still remains intact.  As Bruce Shelley notes, “Obviously Chalcedon did not solve the problem of how deity can unite with humanity in a singly person.  At the human level the problem resists explanation.  The Bible regards the Event as absolutely unique.  The merit of the Chalcedonian statement lies in the boundaries it established.  In effect, it erected a fence and said, “Within this lies the  mystery of the God-man” (Shelley, 115).  Leontius’ interpretation simply clarified what it meant to say that Jesus was fully God and fully man.  Contra the Alexandrians, Christ is not some unusual hybrid substance and contra the Antiochene’s Christ is not two persons so intimately joined that their individual identities are lost.  Jesus is one person with two natures.


There are times in which the theologian, in his struggle to accurately interpret what the Bible teaches about the nature of God, must carefully scrutinize his terminology–searching out the, “meaning in this phrase or that syllable” (St. Basil, 16).  When it comes to defining the nature of Christ, precision is everything.  As the Church Father’s discovered, the slightest variance in terminology could have drastic effects on who we perceived Christ to be.  A wrong interpretation could lead to a number of theological difficulties–as well as practical difficulties–and even heresy.  As it turns out, philosophy was a huge asset to the Church Fathers, as they struggled to develop an orthodox understanding of the nature of Christ.  The utilization of philosophical terminology enabled the Church Father’s to make subtle, yet crucial, distinctions between important categories, and provided a metaphysical framework in which clear theological discussion could take place.


McGrath, Alister E.  (1997).  Christian Theology: An Introduction. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

Mitchell, Craig V.  (2007). Charts of Philosophy and Philosophers. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.

Olson, Roger E.  (1999).  The Story of Christian Theology: Twenty Centuries of Tradition     and Reform.  Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic.

Shelley, Bruce L.  (2008).  Church History In Plain Language.  Nashville TN: Thomas Nelson

St. Basil the Great.  Trans. David Anderson.  (1980).  On the Holy Spirit. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press.

St. John of Damascus.  Trans. Frederic H. Chase, Jr.  (1958). The Fathers of the Church. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press.