Cadbury Lectures 2015


Thoroughly enjoyed the opportunity to listen to William Lane Craig at this years Cadbury Lectures at the University of Birmingham!

Dr. Craig lectured on the challenge that “heavyweight” Platonism – the idea that abstract objects, like numbers, sets, and possible worlds, exist and are as real as concrete objects like cars or persons – poses to Classical Theism.  He surveyed the range of possible responses available to the Theist and put forth several arguments against the traditional notion that abstract objects exist in the mind of God.

Ultimately, Dr. Craig advocates an anti-realist approach to abstracta; which is quite a controversial position for a Christian philosopher to adopt.  While I can appreciate why he is making this move, I’m not convinced it’s the correct one to make.

Nevertheless, it was a great experience and a wonderful opportunity to meet a great scholar.  Here’s a picture featuring WLC with my dear friend Tyler McNabb (a PhD candidate at the University of Glasgow) and yours truly:



4 thoughts on “Cadbury Lectures 2015

    • From what I can tell he seems more concerned with the threat that non-theistic Platonism poses. He just doesn’t think Christian platonism or conceptualism work – at least, not on their own. During the Q&A session on Wednesday he stated that he’s open to some form of combination between conceptualism and anti-realism which is interesting. But, I’m with you in questioning the move to antirealism.

      • Hm. That would make a bit more sense, though I get the feeling that he seems to think that *any* form of Christian platonism leaves open the possibility of co-eternal abstract objects. On a purely philosophical level, though, I actually think his antirealism is pretty interesting regarding propositions – he really meshes together a pragmatist/nominalist semantic that, if one is anxious to avoid overcommittment (ontologically speaking), is quite attractive.

      • Yeah, I think you’re right. In fact, I whole heartedly embrace his critique of contemporary philosophy of language. It seems incredibly misguided, in my book, to justify our ontological commitments purely on semantical grounds. But, then, I also think it’s misguided for language or epistemology to be our “first philosophy”. That being said, I’m not ready to embrace antirealism; I’ve got to much of the Church Father’s in me.

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