Evolution and Reason with G. K. Chesterton

“Evolution is either an innocent scientific description of how certain earthly things came about; or, if it is anything more than this, it is an attack upon thought itself. If evolution destroys anything, it does not destroy religion but rationalism. If evolution simply means that a positive thing called an ape turned very slowly into a positive thing called a man, then it is stingless for the most orthodox; for a personal God might just as well do things slowly as quickly – especially if, like the Christian God, he were outside time. But if it means anything more, it means that there is no such thing as an ape to change, and no such thing as a man for him to change into. It means that there is no such thing as a thing. At best, there is only one thing, and that is a flux of everything and anything. This is an attack not upon faith, but upon the mind; you cannot think if there are no things to think about.”

Exploring the Eastern Catholic Church

As many of you know, my family and I came into full communion with the Catholic Church in 2013. This momentous event took place at St. Nicholas Ukrainian Greek Catholic Mission in Raleigh NC – an Eastern Catholic parish of the Byzantine Rite.

Most of my Protestant friends and, surprisingly, the majority of Roman Catholics I know, have never encountered the eastern Church.  In fact, most assume “Eastern Catholicism” is just another name for Eastern Orthodoxy.

This common mistake is understandable.  Practically speaking, Eastern Catholics are Orthodox – they use the same liturgy, and share a common theological and spiritual tradition.  Like the Orthodox, Eastern Catholics utilize icons and incense in their worship and have married priests.

The only substantive difference is that Eastern Catholics are in full communion with Rome and the Pope.  That  means that they are fully Catholic.

If you find any of this interesting I encourage you to watch the video above!  Also, I would urge you to read this powerful apostolic letter written by St. John Paul II: Oriental Lumen.


Cadbury Lectures 2015


Thoroughly enjoyed the opportunity to listen to William Lane Craig at this years Cadbury Lectures at the University of Birmingham!

Dr. Craig lectured on the challenged that “heavyweight” Platonism – the idea that abstract objects, like numbers, sets, and possible worlds, exist and are as real as concrete objects like cars or persons – poses to Classical Theism.  He surveyed the range of possible responses available to the Theist and put forth several arguments against the traditional notion that abstract objects exist in the mind of God.

Ultimately, Dr. Craig advocates an anti-realist approach to abstracta; which is quite a controversial position for a Christian philosopher to adopt.  While I can appreciate why he is making this move, I’m not convinced it’s the correct one to make.

Nevertheless, it was a great experience and a wonderful opportunity to meet a great scholar.  Here’s a picture featuring WLC with my dear friend Tyler McNabb (a PhD candidate at the University of Glasgow) and yours truly:



Philosopher’s Diary

Periodically, I’ll share some news about my studies at the University of Birmingham.  Like, right now . . .

The next seven weeks are going to be intense. I’ve got three major essay’s to write and my dissertation proposal needs major revision!  Here are my essay topics:

(1) In the frist essay I’ll be arguing against David Benatar’s controversial thesis that existence is always a harm in favor of the Eastern Catholic view that existence is good.  Once establishing this ontological principle I will demolish Benatar’s “qualified defense” of suicide.

(2) In my second essay I’ll be arguing against David Lewis’s form of modal realism.  I will also argue in favor of an Aristotelian/Thomistic conception of modality.

(3) Finally, in essay three, I’ll make the case that natural rights theories of human rights are compatible with agreement theories.  Both theories have drawbacks and merits but are often juxtaposed. My aim is to show that the theories are not mutually exclusive.

My thesis, which I will explain in greater detail later, will involve arguing for the incoherence of ontological physicalism.  It should be really fun!

In addition to all this writing, I’m very much looking forward to meeting William Lane Craig in a couple of weeks.  He’s delivering this years Cadbury Lectures.

Well, that’s all for now.  More updates to come soon!

Meghan Sullivan and Trent Dougherty on the Problem of Evil

In the wake of Stephen Fry’s viral video, in which he passionately condemns God for apparently doing nothing to prevent the existence of gratuitous evil, there has been renewed popular interest in what philosopher’s call the problem of evil.

In response to this, I provided a reading list for those interested in studying the issue in greater depth.

For those seeking more resources, this video, produced by the Center for the Philosophy of Religion at Notre Dame, is excellent.  It features two philosopher’s–Meghan Sullivan and Trent Dougherty–in a roundtable discussion on the primary challenges posed by the problem of evil for Classical Theists:


On Sin as Spiritual Adultery with Brant Pitre

“From an ancient Jewish perspective, if we look at the God of Israel as the divine Bridegroom, then this changes not only the way we see the Creator, but also the way we see transgressions against God, what we call “sin.” For if the God of Israel is not just a Creator, or a Lawgiver, but the Bridegroom, then sin is not just the breaking of a rule or a law, but the betrayal of a relationship.”

Thomistic Dualism . . . an Addendum


Years ago, as an undergraduate student, I wrote a paper on Thomistic dualism that I later published on this blog.  In an odd turn of events, Steven Novella, a clinical neurologist and assistant professor at Yale, recently embedded a link to this paper on his blog Neurologica.

My initial response to this was: “Why the heck is a neurologist from Yale sending people to my poorly written undergraduate philosophy paper?”

Upon further investigation, I was horrified to discover that my article is second only to Wikipedia when one searches “Thomistic dualism” on Google.

Novella is no fan of hylomorphism (the more sophisticated name for Aquinas’s version of dualism) and, obviously, could careless about the quality of the article he has linked to.  However, I am quite sympathetic to this view and cringe at the thought that my paper is the only exposure to Thomistic dualism that many people will ever have.

Hylomorphism is a serious metaphysical doctrine that many contemporary philosopher’s are attracted to.  If you’ve only read my article, you’ve gotten a very weak introduction to this subject. I encourage you to check out the following two books for a more sophisticated explication of Aquinas’s ideas:

Philosophy of Mind by Edward Feser


Real Essentialism by David Oderberg


The Utter Meaninglessness of Life: A Response to Neil Levy


Theistic philosophers often argue that the naturalistic worldview renders life completely meaningless (Craig, 1994, p57-75).  On their understanding, objective meaning can only be derived from a transcendent–i.e., supernatural–source.  But many philosophers question this assumption.

One such philosopher is Neil Levy who believes we can find meaning in life and that we can do so within a, “thoroughly naturalistic framework” (Levy, 2005, p180).  According to him, there are superlatively meaningful activities or projects–e.g., the pursuit of truth or justice or beauty–that, once engaged in, make life truly and deeply meaningful.

In this essay I argue that Levy’s projects fail to confer meaning to life.  In section one I discuss the nature of a meaningful life from the naturalistic perspective–specifically addressing the notion of meaning-conferring activities.  In the second section, I present two major challenges to the naturalistic conception of meaningful activities: the problem of circularity and Mill’s Dilemma.  In part three I explain how Levy attempts to overcome these challenges through his notion of projects.  Finally, in section four I show that Levy’s projects fail to overcome the challenges.  In so doing I demonstrate that, given naturalism, life is utterly meaningless.

The Nature of a Meaningful Life

The characteristic picture of a meaningless life is that of a farmer, “who grows more corn to feed more hogs to buy more land to grow more corn to feed more hogs” (Levy, p178).  Although the farmer is achieving concrete goals–i.e., feeding hogs and growing corn–his life is pointless because he is not engaged in any activities beyond his own subjective self-interested existence.  His life is, thus, a circular chain of events and manifestly insignificant.

Consequentially, the majority of naturalistic philosophers agree: if there is any hope of finding meaning we must escape the banality, pointlessness, and circularity of a life like that of the farmer envisioned above.  We must orientate our lives around activities which promote goods beyond the circle (Levy, p179).

Examples of such meaning-conferring activities often include things like science, art, sports, food, or family.  Such activities, it is argued, engage us with something that, “transcends our-selves, with goods which are not merely subjective but (at least) intersubjective” (Levy, p180).  In other words, they engage us with goods that are beneficial to all and outstrip mundane activities that merely maintain our existence.

Two Challenges

Levy notes, however, that there are two substantial challenges to this construal of meaning.  The first is that many of the alleged meaning conferring activities only appear to escape the problem of circularity that plagues the life of the farmer.  Consider the example of investing in your family.  Imagine two parents who find meaning in rearing their children so that they can grow up and start families of their own to find meaning in rearing their children, etc. A life dedicated to the family is no less circular than the life of the farmer.  As Levy puts it, “this account of meaning seems merely to substitute a larger circle for a smaller” (Levi, p180).

The second obstacle facing this account of meaning we shall call “Mill’s Dilemma”–so named after the famous ethicist and political philosopher to which it is attributed.  It points out that meaning conferring activities lose their meaning when the aim of the activity has been reached.  For example, if you dedicate your life to creating a just society and this goal is realised you will have nothing left to live for (assuming it was the only meaningful activity you were engaged in). One can just as easily imagine having successfully attained every meaningful goal they had striven for.  With no more meaningful activities to engage in, life would be pointless.

But suppose, in an effort to escape the dilemma, we argue that our goals are inherently unrealisable–that they can never be reached.  This, too, is problematic because making progress at achieving our goals is impossible if our goals are inherently unachievable.  Imagine if, no matter how hard you worked, you never progressed towards generating a more just society.  Imagine if, as a matter of principle, it was impossible to achieve a just society.  Would such an activity still be meaningful?  Clearly, it would not (Levy, p182).

Levy’s Solution

In spite of these obstacles, Levy maintains there are activities, or projects (as he terms it), that avoid both the trap of circularity and escape Mill’s Dilemma (Levi, p184).  Such projects are superlatively meaningful, because they are highly valuable pursuits that promote goods beyond themselves and thus transcend the charge of circularity.  They are also open-ended–i.e., they have no fixed goals–and thus avoid the trap of Mill’s Dilemma.  As Levy states it:

There are, I shall suggest, valuable activities which are inherently open-ended – not because they aim for a goal that cannot be achieved, but because the goal they pursue is not fixed prior to the activity itself. Instead, the goal is gradually defined and more precisely specified in the course of its pursuit, so that the end of the activity is always itself one of its stakes (Levy, p185).

So, according to Levy, the pursuit of justice would qualify as a project as long as we understand that the end or goal or meaning of justice is something that progresses and changes over time.  There is no fixed universal idea of justice that, once realised, ends our pursuit.  Rather, the idea of justice evolves as we pursue it.  We, therefore, progress toward our goals without ever achieving them.  Not because the goals are inherently unrealisable, but, because the goals are not fixed.  As Levy puts it, “the ends of superlatively meaningful activities cannot be achieved, because as the activities evolve, so the ends at which they aim alter and are refined” (Levy, p186).

Other examples of projects would be the pursuit of knowledge or truth, the pursuit of beauty, and the pursuit of the good.  According to Levy these are all open-ended activities of tremendous value–the pursuit of which confers real meaning to life.

An Ever Expanding Circle

At a glance, Levy’s projects appear to have overcome both the problem of circularity and Mill’s Dilemma.  Projects seem to take us beyond our-selves and are inherently valuable; thus they transcend the banality of the farmers life.  Continuous progress seems feasible in the pursuit of a project while a final completion does not.  So, it appears Mill’s Dilemma is safely avoided (Levy, p184).  But, do projects stand upon closer evaluation?  To find out we must first consider the nature of progress.

Progress necessarily requires an end or standard. It is impossible to move forward, to advance, to make headway, toward an undefined goal.  To see that this is true, consider the following example.  Professor Yujin informs his class at the beginning of the semester that the goal of the module is not based upon any fixed criteria.  Rather, he says, the aim of the class is undefined; as class activities evolve the ends at which they aim will be altered and refined.  Furthermore, he explains that it will not be possible to achieve a final grade because the criteria for measuring success is open-ended.  Given Yujin’s guidelines, or lack thereof, it would be impossible to make headway in his class.  To be sure, one would move, like a canoe swept along down a stream that never terminates, but they would not progress.  For there is nothing to progress to; no destination as it were.

The same is true of Levy’s projects.  If the pursuit of beauty is open-ended–if it has no fixed goal–it is inconceivable that one engaged in such an activity could make progress.  Like Yujin’s directionless class one would have no basis by which to judge whether they were closer to achieving their goals or not.  Like a child assigned an open-ended list of chores, their task would never end:

Child: “Mother I’ve put away my toys, have I finished my chores?”

Mother: “Well done! But did you make your bed?”

Child: “Mother I’ve made my bed, now have I finished my chores?”

Mother: “Good job, but did you tidy your little sisters room?”

Child: “Mother I’ve I’ve tidied her room, now have I finished my chores?”

Mother: “Excellent, but did you mop the bathroom floor?

Levy’s projects, like this child’s open-ended list of chores, are based upon contingent factors which are constantly in flux.  One does not progress while engaged in them; one simply acts.

This, of course, brings us right back to the same dilemma Levy was attempting to avoid.  Namely, it renders projects meaningless because continuous progress, in fact progress of any kind, is inherently impossible.  But this is only the first problem.  The second problem is far worse.

The person engaged in one of Levy’s open-ended projects, while not progressing, is moving from one goal to the next as they evolve.  As I previously stated, they are like a canoe swept along down a stream that never terminates.  It would be a mistake, however, to imagine this stream extended indefinitely in either direction like a geometric line. The stream is not infinite–for the world in which we engage in projects is finite.  Circumscribed and limited as it is, the stream never terminates because it follows a circular path.

Thus, we pursue a just society, so that our children might pursue a revised conception of a just society, so that our grandchildren might pursue a revision of the revision, etc.  Eventually, given enough time, future generations embrace the same conception of justice that we did.  For there is not an indefinite number of ways to conceive of a just society.  As a wise man once said, “What has been is what will be, and what has been done is what will be done; and there is nothing new under the sun” (RSV Ecclesiastes 1:9).

Another example would be the evolution of metaphysics.  The Platonists and Aristotelians speak of substance, the Continental Rationalists redefine substance,  the British Empiricists question the notion of substance, the Postmoderns and Logical Positivists deny the existence of substance, Analytic Philosophers destroy Logical Positivism and Postmodernism, and the Neo-Aristotelians bring back the ancient notion of substance.  Even philosophical pursuits, which Levy claims are, “paradigmatically valuable activities,” become regressively circular.

There are only a finite number of memes or ideas to be passed around from generation to generation as we pursue projects.  The pursuit of beauty can only be redefined so many times.  Inevitably the same memes will resurface and there is no transcendent reality we can embrace to break the cycle.  Levy’s solution simply trades a smaller circle for a larger one.  The person pursuing projects is living as meaningless a life as the farmer growing corn to feed hogs to buy land to grow more corn.


Neil Levy believes his conception of projects provides an escape from the problem of circularity and the challenge of Mill’s Dilemma that plague naturalistic attempts at finding meaning.  I have demonstrated, however, that projects fail to do so.  Because the goal of a project is open-ended it is inherently impossible to make progress because progress requires fixed goals by which we can measure success.  Our inability to progress coupled with the impossibility of success renders projects meaningless.  Furthermore, projects are regressively circular and, thus, ultimately pointless.  There are, therefore, no superlatively meaningful activities given naturalism.  Life is utterly meaningless.


Craig, W. (1994). Reasonable faith. Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway      Books.

Levy, N. (2005). Downshifting and meaning in life. Ratio, 18(2), pp.176-189.




Eric Jobe on Violence in the Old Testament


Eric Jobe is a Ph.D candidate in the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at the University of Chicago.  My friend Joel recently shared Eric’s blog, Departing Horeb, on Facebook and I was very impressed.

Currently, he’s writing a series on understanding violence in the Old Testament. I found the first essay extremely fascinating and very informative.  For anyone interested in gaining a better understanding of the historical context of the time in which the Old Testament documents were written and compiledI highly recommend this blog.

Here’s the introduction to Eric’s first post on this fascinating topic:

Deuteronomy 21:10-14 presents commandments regarding the taking of female prisoners of war, and the process of how a soldier may go about taking his female prisoner of war as a wife.

10 “When you go out to war against your enemies, and the LORD your God delivers them into your hand, and you take them captive, 11 and you see among the captives a beautiful woman, and desire her and would take her for your wife,  12 then you shall bring her home to your house, and she shall shave her head and trim her nails.  13 She shall put off the clothes of her captivity, remain in your house, and mourn her father and her mother a full month; after that you may go in to her and be her husband, and she shall be your wife.  14 And it shall be, if you have no delight in her, then you shall set her free, but you certainly shall not sell her for money; you shall not treat her brutally, because you have humbled her. (NKJV)

Immediately, we blush at the notion of God giving instructions on what and what not to do in regard to forced marriage of female prisoners, and herein lies our problem, which is an apparent ethical disparity between the Late Bronze Age and Early Iron Age and our own day. Before we look at Christian interpretations of this passage and some possible ways we can resolve this disparity in our own minds, let’s look at Jewish exegesis of this passage to see what these men, who spent their entire lives meticulously contemplating the Torah, had to say.

click here to read the entire blog.